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Abstract 
Oil price shocks and economic policy uncertainty are interrelated and influence stock 
market return. For the U.S. an unanticipated increase in policy uncertainty has a 
significant negative effect on real stock returns. A positive oil-market specific demand 
shock (indicating greater concern about future oil supplies) significantly raises economic 
policy uncertainty and reduces real stock returns. The direct effects of oil shocks on real 
stock returns are amplified by endogenous policy uncertainty responses. Economic policy 
uncertainty and oil-market specific demand shock account for 19% and 12% of the long-
run variability in real stock returns, respectively. As a robustness check, (domestic) 
economic policy uncertainty is shown to also significantly influence real stock returns in 
Europe and in energy-exporting Canada. 
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Oil Shocks, Policy Uncertainty and Stock Market Return 
1. Introduction 
The literature on the relationship between oil shocks and stock market activities 
has shown that changes in the price of crude oil are associated with the fluctuation of 
stock prices. Early papers by Kling (1985), Jones and Kaul (1996), and Sadorsky (1999), 
among others, report a stable negative association between oil price shocks and stock 
price movements.
1
 Recent papers by Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009), and Kilian and Park 
(2009), among others, suggest that different price shocks in the crude oil market have 
distinct effects on the stock market, in the sense that the responses of aggregate stock 
returns differs depending on the cause of oil supply or demand shocks.  
The effect of uncertainty about economic policy on real activity and firm level 
decisions has also been emphasized in the literature. Baker et al. (2011) construct a 
measure of economic policy uncertainty and find that it influences the intensity of the 
business cycle and influences the business investment. Durnev (2011) finds that corporate 
investment is less sensitive to stock prices during election years. Boutchkova et al. (2012) 
relate political uncertainty to stock volatility. Pastor and Veronesi (2012) build a general 
equilibrium model predicting stock prices fall at the announcement of a policy change.  
                                                          
1
 Papers by Apergis and Miller (2009), Miller and Ratti (2009) and Peersman and Van Robays (2012), 
among others, show that the impact of oil price shocks on stock markets and real variables differs across 
countries. Work reporting that oil price increases lead to reduced stock returns for oil importing countries 
includes O’Neil et al. (2008) for US, UK and France, and Park and Ratti (2008) for US and 12 European oil 
importing countries. Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) argue that the negative effects for oil 
importing countries are reinforced because of intensive trade connections. A number of papers find that 
large oil price changes have a positive impact on stock returns in oil-exporting countries (e.g., Arouri and 
Rault (2011)). Filis et al. (2011) provide an extensive review. 
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Oil shocks and economic policy uncertainty are interrelated and influence real 
stock returns. Oil price shocks and economic policy uncertainty influence stock prices 
through affecting expected cash flows and/or discount rates. Given the importance of oil 
price shocks for the economy the issue of the appropriate response by policy makers 
arises. Oil price shocks change relative prices, redistribute income and influence 
expectations about inflation and the real interest rate. Structural oil price shocks can 
influence economic policy uncertainty.
2
 Oil price increases driven by increased global 
aggregate demand for commodities might be associated with reduced economic policy 
uncertainty. Oil price increases caused by precautionary demand for crude oil in 
anticipation of oil shortages might be associated with increased economic policy 
uncertainty. It is necessary to allow for the endogenous relationships in order to identify 
the effect of policy uncertainty on real stock returns.  
For the U.S. it is found that oil-market specific demand shocks account for over 
25% of variation in economic policy uncertainty after 24 months. After recognizing the 
interrelationships between structural oil price shocks and economic policy uncertainty, 
the latter accounts for 19% of the long-term variability in real stock returns. Structural oil 
shocks account for about 33% of the long-term variability in real stock returns. As a 
robustness check, a positive innovation in (domestic) economic policy uncertainty is 
shown to significantly reduce real stock returns in Canada, an energy-exporting country, 
and in Europe, a net importer of crude oil. For Europe the effect of oil shocks on real 
stock returns are intensified compared to the U.S. and for Canada, an energy exporting 
                                                          
2
 Higher volatility in oil prices has also been associated with increased uncertainty at firms. Elder and 
Serletis (2010) and Rahman and Serletis (2011) find that uncertainty about changes in the real price of oil 
has significant negative effects on real economic activity. Yoon and Ratti (2011) connect oil price change 
and volatility to firm level investment. 
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country, oil-market specific demand shocks are positively related to real stock returns. 
We conduct the above analysis by extending a structural VAR model proposed by Kilian 
(2009). 
 The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
structural VAR model and empirical methodology. Section 3 describes data sources. 
Section 4 discusses empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
 The structural VAR model in Kilian (2009) is adapted to examine the effects of 
three structural oil price shocks on U.S. economic policy uncertainty and the U.S. stock 
market. Oil price shocks can affect corporate cash flow since oil is an input in production 
and because oil price changes can influence the demand for output at industry and 
national levels. Uncertainty about taxes and regulations can influence firm-level 
decisions about production and expected sales. Oil price shocks and economic policy 
uncertainty can also affect firm value by influencing the expected rate of inflation and the 
expected real interest rate.  
The structural representation of the VAR model of order p  in a five variable 
setting is 
 0 0
1
,
p
t i t i t
i
A y c A y 

    (1) 
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where ( , , , , ),t t t t t ty prod rea rpo pu ret   a 5 1  vector of endogenous variables, 0A
denotes the 5 5  contemporaneous coefficient matrix, 0c  
represents a 5 1  vector of 
constant terms, 
iA  refers to the 5 5  autoregressive coefficient matrices, and t  
stands 
for a 5 1  vector of structural disturbances.  
The model attributes flucuations in the real price of oil to oil supply-side shocks 
measured by changes in world oil production (
tprod ), the shocks to the global demand 
for all industrial commodities driven by global real aggegate demand (
trea ), and the oil-
market specific demand shocks captured by changes in real oil prices (
trpo ). Kilian 
(2009) and Kilian and Park (2009) interpret 
trpo  as reflecting precautionary demand for 
oil driven by expections on the future shortfalls of oil supply. 
tpu  denotes the index of 
U.S. economic policy uncertainty and 
tret  is real aggregate U.S. stock returns. U.S. 
economic policy uncertainty  and stock return are ordered fourth and fifth variables, 
respectively, after the three structural oil price shocks in the recursive structural VAR 
model. 
We follow Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009) and take 24p   to allow for 
the potentially long-delayed effects of structural oil price shocks on the economy.
3
 A 
sufficient number of lags remove serial correlation and make the error terms stationary 
(i.e., (0)I ) which is formally tested by ADF and PP unit root tests.
4
 Since our goal is 
forecasting rather than inference, the specification preserves the information about both 
                                                          
3
 Sims (1998) and Sims et al. (1990) argue that even variables that display no inertia do not necessarily 
show absence of long lags in regressions on other variables. 
4
 The stationary test on error terms is necessary to show that the structural VAR model does not suffer from 
instability condition. The result is not reported in the text for the simplicity of exposition.  
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the variables and models used in the established literature to make our results 
comparable.
5
  
The reduced form VAR is obtained by multiplying both sides of Equation (1) with 
1
0A

 
which has a recursive structure such that the reduced form errors 
te  
are linear 
combinations of the structural errors 
t  
in the following, 
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in which 
prod
t

 
reflects the oil supply-side shocks, 
rea
t  captures the real aggregate 
demand shocks, 
rpo
t  denotes the oil market-specific demand shock, 
pu
t  measures the 
economic policy uncertainty shocks, and 
ret
t  is the real aggregate stock return shocks.  
 The identifying restrictions are motivated by Kilian (2009). The crude oil supply 
does not respond to contemporaneous changes in oil demand, because of the high 
adjustment cost of oil production. The fluctuation of real prices of oil does not affect 
global real economic activity within the same month. An oil supply disruption and real 
aggregate demand shock will influence the real price of oil, immediately, in the sense that 
the expectations about future oil supply shortfall and/or global real economy downturn 
                                                          
5
 Forecasting concerns the investigation of impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decompositions, whereas the inference refers the study of estimates of regression coefficients. When we are 
not clear a prior whether a variable should be first-differenced, the impulse responses are reasonably 
precisely estimated using the (log-) levels of variables in the VAR model (e.g., Sims et al. (1990) and 
Kilian and Murphy (2012)). 
7 
 
drive the precautionary demand for oil up within the same month. U.S. economic policy 
uncertainty reacts contemporaneously to all three structural oil price shocks, as do real 
stock returns. The U.S. stock market is assumed to react to U.S. economic policy 
uncertainty, contemporaneously. Kilian and Vega (2011) argue there is no significant 
evidence of feedback within a month from U.S. aggregates to the price of crude oil. The 
model specification is in line with the standard approach of treating innovations to the 
price of oil as pretetermined with respect to the economy (e.g., Lee and Ni (2002) and 
Kilian and Park (2009), among others). 
 To generate the standard errors of the impulse response function for the structural 
VAR model, we conduct recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications 
proposed by Gonçalves and Kilian (2004), in that the modified recursive-design bootstrap 
method yields asymptotic refinements for autoregressive models. 
3. Data 
 The study utilizes monthly time-series data on the crude oil market, indext of U.S. 
economic policy uncertainty, and aggregate U.S. stock returns over 1985:1-2011:12. The 
sample period is determined by the availability of the index of U.S. economic policy 
uncertainty starting on January 1985. The aggregate U.S. stock return variable is from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and is a value-weighted market portfolio 
which includes NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks. Aggregate U.S. stock return is 
adjusted by the U.S. CPI to obtain a real stock return variable. 
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 The world production of crude oil as a proxy for oil supply and U.S. refiner’s 
acquisition cost of crude oil as a measure on the prices of oil are drawn from the U.S. 
Department of Energy. The index of real aggregate demand as an indicator of global real 
economic activity is obtained from Kilian (2009).
6
 In line with Kilian (2009) the percent 
change in the oil supply is 100  multiplied by the log difference of the world crude oil 
production in millions of barrels per day averaged monthly. The real price of oil is the 
refiner’s acquisition cost of crude oil deflated by the U.S. CPI available from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. The index of real aggregate demand is based on the equal-weighted 
dry cargo freight rates. An increase in this index indicates a higher demand for shipping 
services arising from increases in real economic activity of the world. An advantage of 
the measure is that it includes activity in emerging economies such as China and India 
that are excluded from conventional measures of global economic activity based on 
OECD countries. 
 The measure on U.S. economic policy uncertainty is a weighted average of four 
uncertainty components: news-based policy uncertainty, CPI forecast interquartile range, 
tax legislation expiration, and federal expenditures forecast interquartile range.
7
 It is 
constructed by Baker et al. (2011).
8
 News-based uncertainty reflects media coverage of 
economic policy uncertainty, constructed by the month-by-month searches of Google 
News for articles containing the term ‘uncertainty’ and items related to economy and 
economic (e.g., monetary and fiscal) policies. The number of articles that discuss both 
U.S. economy and policy uncertainty each month quantifies the news-based uncertainty 
                                                          
6
 The data is available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkillinan/. 
7
 Baker et al. (2011) set the weights to 1/2 on the news uncertainty and 1/6 on each of taxation expiration, 
CPI disagreement, and expenditure dispersion components.  
8
 The data can be found at http://www.policyuncertainty.com/. 
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in that month.
9
 The CPI disagreement and federal government expenditure dispersion are 
measured by the forecasters’ disagreement (the interquartile range of forecast) over future 
outcomes about inflation rates and federal government purchases, respectively.
10
 The tax 
code expiration is a ‘transitory measure’ constructed by the number of temporary federal 
tax code provisions set to expire in the contemporaneous calendar year and future ten 
years and reported by the Joint Committee on Taxation.
11
 
Figure 1 shows real prices of crude oil, (overall) economic policy uncertainty, and 
stock market index in U.S. over 1985:1-2011:12. The timing of the outbreak of major 
historical events is marked in the figure. It can be seen that all dates of well-known 
events are followed by rises in the policy uncertainty and falls in the stock market index. 
These events and Bloom’s (2009) choice of major uncertainty shocks coincide with 
events that trigger oil price shocks identified by Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2009). For 
example, the 2008-2009 financial crises caused shocks to precautionary demand for oil. 
The 1
st
/2
nd
 Gulf War and Arab Spring caused supply-side oil price shock and oil-market 
specific demand shock.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Variance Decomposition of real stock returns 
                                                          
9
 The raw counts about the news uncertainty are normalized by the number of news articles that contain the 
term ‘today’ in order to mitigate the volume accumulation and high-frequency noise problems. 
10
 The quarterly raw data of the forecast about inflation rates and federal government purchases are drawn 
from the survey of professional forecasters of Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The index value of 
monthly CPI disagreement and expenditure dispersion is held constant for each quarter.   
11
 The index value of taxation uncertainty is obtained for each January and kept constant for 12 months in 
the year. 
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The forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) of real stock returns are 
reported in Table 1 from the estimation of the structural VAR model in Equation (2) 
( , , , , ).t t t t t ty prod rea rpo pu ret   In Panel A forecast error variance decompositions 
results are reported when 
tpu  is (overall) economic policy uncertainty. In Panels B, C, D 
and E, forecast error variance decomposition results are reported when 
tpu is replaced in 
turn by each of its components, news-based policy uncertainty, tax legislation expiration, 
federal expenditures forecast interquartile range, and CPI forecasters’ interquartile range, 
respectively. The FEVDs show the percent contribution of structural shocks in the crude 
oil market and in economic policy uncertainty to the overall variation of real stock returns. 
The values in parentheses in Table 1 represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' 
standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap.  
In Panel A of Table 1 it can be seen that in the first few months the effects of the 
three structural oil price shocks on real stock returns are negligible and not statistically 
significant. At 3 months, economic policy uncertainty explains 7.7% of the variation in 
real stock returns and the effect is marginally significant. Over time the explanatory 
power of the three structural shocks in the crude oil market and of economic policy 
uncertainty increase. In the long-term shocks to global oil supply, shocks to global real 
demand, and oil-market specific demand shocks explain 11.5%, 10.0%, and 11.9% of the 
variation in real stock returns, respectively, and that these results are statistically 
significant. It is reported in Table 1 is that economic policy uncertainty explains 19.0% of 
variation of real stock returns and this result is highly statistically significant.  
11 
 
 Examination of the results in the last four Panels of Table 1 indicate that shocks to 
real stock returns are closely related to the volume of news stories focused on discussion 
of economic policy, rather than the expenditure/CPI forecast dispersions and the tax code 
expirations. Policy uncertainty measured by the volume of news stories focused on 
discussion of economic policy explain 19.4% of the variation in real stock returns in the 
long-term (in Panel B). It should be noted though that the FEVD results for real stock 
returns when policy uncertainty is measured by the expenditure/CPI forecast dispersions 
and the tax code expirations are statistically less significant. In summary, the results in 
Table 1 indicate that in the long-term the structural oil price shocks and economic policy 
uncertainty explain 33.4% and 19.0% of the variation in real stock returns, respectively.  
4.2. Variance Decomposition of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
The forecast error variance decompositions of overall economic policy 
uncertainty are reported in Panel A of Table 2.
12
 It shows the percent contribution of 
structural shocks in the crude oil market to the overall variation of U.S. economic policy 
uncertainty. In the first few months the effects of the three structural oil price shocks on 
U.S. economic policy uncertainty are negligible. Over time the explanatory power of the 
three structural shocks in the crude oil market increases. After 24 months 25.5% of the 
volatility in economic policy uncertainty is accounted for by the innovations of 
unanticipated precautionary demand for oil. After 60 months this becomes 49%. These 
effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. Over the longer term the forecast error 
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 The variance decomposition results for components of economic policy uncertainty are reported in Panel 
B, C, D and E of Table 2. After 60 months oil-market specific demand shocks explain statistically 
significant 39.7% of the variance in news-based economic policy uncertainty and 25.1% of CPI forecasters’ 
interquartile range, respectively. Over the same longer term, shocks to global real aggregate demand are 
found to explain large statistically significant fractions (31.8%) of the variance in federal expenditure 
policy uncertainties and 44.3% of the variance in tax code expiration uncertainties. These effects are also 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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variance decompositions (FEVDs) of economic policy uncertainty to innovations in 
global oil production and in global real demand are much smaller at 5.7% and 8.7%, 
respectively, not statistically significant. 
In contrast to the effect of structural oil price shocks on economic policy 
uncertainty, the fraction of forecast error variance decomposition of economic policy 
uncertainty due to shocks to real stock price doesn’t vary greatly with forecast horizon. 
After 3 months, 24 months, and 60 months innovations in real stock returns account for 
9.6%, 9.8%, and 11.6%, respectively, of the volatility in economic policy uncertainty.
13
 
The results of this and the previous subsection imply that although structural oil 
price shocks significantly explain movement in economic policy uncertainty (and real 
stock returns), innovations to economic policy uncertainty also significantly impact real 
stock returns. 
4.3. Impulse response functions 
 Figure 2 reports the impulse response functions (IRFs) over 24 months of global 
oil production, global real economic activity, real price of oil, economic policy 
uncertainty, and real stock return to one-standard deviation structural shocks. One-
standard error and two-standard error bands indicated by dashed and dotted lines, 
respectively, are computed by conducting recursive-design wild bootrap with 2,000 
replications proposed by Gonçalves and Kilian (2004). The analysis of the IRFs presents 
the short-run dynamic response of dependent variables (i.e., vertical axis labels) to the 
structural shocks.  
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 The FEVD result for policy uncertainty is similar when policy uncertainty is measured by the news-based 
policy uncertainty and is statistically less significant when measured by the expenditure/CPI forecast 
dispersions and the tax code expirations. 
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In the first row of Figure 2 are shown the responses of global oil production to 
structural innovations in global oil production, global real economic activity, the real 
price of oil, economic policy uncertainty, and real stock return. The effect of an 
unanticipated supply disruption on global oil production is very persistent and highly 
significant. A positive global real activity shock has a persistent positive effect on global 
oil production that is statistically significant for an extended period. Shocks to oil-
specific market demand raise global oil production three to five months later and then 
become insignificant. Shocks to economic policy uncertainty eventually have a negative 
significant effect on global oil production after eighteen months. A positive shock to real 
stock returns significantly raise global oil production over a seven to eleven month 
window following the shock.  
The effect of shocks on global real demand are shown on the second row of 
Figure 2. An unanticipated aggregate demand expansion has a highly significant effect on 
global real economic activity for the first 14 months that gradually erodes over time. A 
positive shock to real oil price raises global aggregate demand significantly for four 
months. Unanticipated innovations to global oil production have a significant positive 
effect on global real demand at ten and eleven months. An unanticated increase in 
economic policy uncertainty has significant negative effects on global real demand over 
ten to twenty four months later. A positive shock to real stock returns does not 
significantly affect global real demand except for a negative effect at nineteen and twenty 
months. 
In the third row of Figure 2, an unanticipated global real aggregate demand 
expansion raises the real prices of oil and the effect becomes larger and statistically 
14 
 
significant after 16 months. Unexpected oil supply disruptions on the real price of oil are 
positive and statistically significant between 10 to 15 months. The effect of an 
unanticipated increase in the real price of oil  on the real price of oil peaks at three 
months and then gradually erodes and is statistically significant for sixteen months. A 
surprise rise in economic policy uncertainty reduces the real price of oil by a statistically 
significant amount in a window between 12 and 16 months. A positive shock to real stock 
returns gradually raises real oil price with the effect peaking and becoming statistically 
significant between eleven and sixteen months. 
In the fourth row of Figure 2 the responses of economic policy uncertainty to one-
standard structural shocks are presented. Unexpected oil supply disruptions do not have a 
statistially significant effect on U.S. economic policy uncertainty. An unanticipated 
positive innovation in global real demand has a negative effect on economic policy 
uncertainty that is statistically significant from the 3
rd
 month to the 9
th
 month. After nine 
months the response becomes statistically insignificant and approaches zero. An 
unexpected positive shock to oil-market specific demand causes a persistent positive 
effect on economic policy uncertainty that is statistically significant from the 3
rd
 month 
through the 24
th
 months shown. Shocks to economic policy uncertainty have an 
immediate effect on economic policy uncertainty that gradually erode with a temporary 
bounce between 10 and 12 months. A positive shock to real stock returns significantly 
reduces economic policy uncertainty in the first four months following the shock, then 
becomes statistically insignificant until becoming positive and statistically significant in 
the last few months of the 24 month window.  
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In the fifth row of Figure 2 the responses of real stock return to structural shocks 
are presented. Unexpected oil supply disruptions do not have a statistically significant 
effect on real stock return in the first fourteen months, and have a significant positive 
effect thereafter. An unanticipated positive innovation in global real demand has a 
positive effect on real stock return that is statistically significant for about one year. An 
unexpected positive shock to oil-market specific demand causes a significant negative 
effect on real stock return after the 8
th
  month. Shocks to economic policy uncertainty 
have a significant negative effect on real stock return in the first two months that is 
gradually reversed with a significant positive effect in the 7
th
 and 8
th
 months. A positive 
shock to real stock returns on real stock returns is highly significant and persistent over 
24 months. 
In summary, the results show that a positive shock to precautionary demand for 
crude oil causes significantly increased economic policy uncertainty and significantly 
reduced real stock returns. These effects are clearly illustrated in the diagrams in the 4
th
 
and 5
th
 rows of column 3 in Figure 2. A positive shock to global real demand causes 
significantly decreased economic policy uncertainty and increased real astock returns. 
These effects are clearly illustrated in the diagrams in the 4
th
 and 5
th
 rows of column 2 in 
Figure 2. An unexpected increase in economic policy uncertainty significantly decreases 
real stock returns at first before being reversed several months later (in the diagram in the 
5
th
 rows of column 4 in Figure 2).  
4.4. Robustness Check: International Evidence 
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To establish the robustness of the result that an unanticipated increase in policy 
uncertainty has a significant negative effect on real stock returns, this subsection 
examines how oil shocks and economic policy uncertainty influence real stock returns in 
Canada, an energy-exporting country, and in Europe, a net importer of crude oil. We 
utilize Brent crude oil as a proxy of world oil price. The stock market indices used are 
TSEurofirst 300 in Europe and S&P/TSX Composite in Canada.
14
 World oil prices and 
aggregate stock returns are deflated by Canada/Europe CPI, respectively, to obtain the 
real variables. The sample period is determined by the availability of the index of 
economic policy uncertainty between 1990:01-2011:12 in Canada and between 1997:01-
2011:12 in Europe.  
Figure 3 reports the impulse response functions over 24 months to one-standard 
deviation structural shocks in Europe. The shock effects of real aggregate demand, oil-
market specific demand, and economic policy uncertainty on real stock returns are 
intensified while other responses are similar to the results obtained in United States. The 
forecast error variance decompositions of real stock returns are presented in Panel A of 
Table 3. The shock effects of European economic policy uncertainty account for a 
statistically significant 24.5% of the volatility in European real stock returns in the long-
term.  
The impulse response functions depict the reactions to one-standard deviation 
structural shocks over 24 months in Canada are reported in Figure 5, whereas the forecast 
error variance decompositions of real stock returns is presented in Panel B of Table 3. For 
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 FTSEurofirst 300 Index represents 300 largest companies ranked by market capitalization in Europe. 
S&P/TSX Composite is an index of the stock prices of the largest companies and comprises about 70% of 
market capitalization for all Canadian-based companies. 
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Canada as an energy-exporting country a positive oil-market specific demand shock 
(indicating greater concern about future oil supplies) significantly raises real stock returns. 
The result is consistent with Arouri and Rault (2011) for oil exporting countries. 
However, for Canada, just as for the U.S. and Europe, a positive innovation in economic 
policy uncertainty reduces real stock returns. In Table 3, Panel B, Canadian economic 
policy uncertainty accounts for a statistically significant 13.5% of the volatility in 
Canadian real stock returns in the long-term. 
Finally, we change the order of the fourth and fifth variables in the structural 
VAR model. In the new model economic policy uncertainty is placed last in the order of 
variables and real stock returns are placed fourth. It is found (in results not reported) that 
the fraction of forecast error variance decomposition of real stock returns due to shocks to 
economic policy uncertainty is statistically significant similar in magnitude to the 
fractions reported in Tables 1 and 3 in the models for the U.S. and Canada and Europe. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between structural oil shocks, 
economic policy uncertainty and real stock returns with structural VAR model. It is found 
that oil-market specific demand shocks account for over 30% of variation in economic 
policy uncertainty after 24 months and that this fraction grows to 58% in the long-term. 
Economic policy uncertainty accounts for 19% of the long-term variability in real stock 
returns and structural oil shocks account for 32% the long-term variability in real stock 
returns.  
18 
 
As a robustness check, a positive innovation in (domestic) economic policy 
uncertainty is shown to significantly reduce real stock returns in Canada, an energy-
exporting country, and in Europe, a net importer of crude oil. For Europe the effect of oil 
shocks on real stock returns are intensified compared to the U.S. and for Canada, an 
energy exporting country, oil-market specific demand shocks are positively related to real 
stock returns. Structural oil price shocks have long-term consequences for economic 
policy uncertainty, and this provides an additional channel by which structural oil price 
shocks have influence on the stock market. 
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             Figure 1. Stock market index (divided by 10), real price of crude oil and economic policy uncertainty, 1985:1-2011:12 in United States.  
Notes: the index of economic policy uncertainty is drawn from Baker et al. (2011), the real price of oil is the nominal price of oil deflated by the U.S. CPI from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the aggregate U.S. market stock index is from CRSP database.  
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Table 1. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of Real U.S. Stock Returns 
Horizon Oil Supply Shock Aggregate Demand Shock Oil-Market Specific Demand Shock  Economic Policy Uncertainty Shocks Other Shocks 
Panel A. Overall Policy Uncertainty 
1 0.000 (0.03) 0.002 (0.14) 0.005 (0.29) 0.054 (1.47) 0.939 (21.27) 
3 0.021 (0.80) 0.034 (1.29) 0.012 (0.57) 0.077 (1.95) 0.857 (16.18) 
12 0.054 (1.50) 0.054 (1.91) 0.067 (2.20) 0.192 (3.97) 0.634 (11.21) 
24 0.108 (2.90) 0.072 (2.46) 0.101 (3.27) 0.192 (4.72) 0.527 (10.87) 
60 0.114 (3.43) 0.099 (3.27) 0.116 (3.88) 0.188 (5.20) 0.483 (11.00) 
∞ 0.115 (3.49) 0.100 (3.19) 0.119 (3.87) 0.190 (5.24) 0.477 (10.91) 
Panel B. News-Based Policy Uncertainty 
1 0.002 (0.12) 0.003 (0.20) 0.004 (0.25) 0.073 (1.69) 0.918 (18.51) 
3 0.018 (0.73) 0.030 (1.15) 0.012 (0.60) 0.105 (2.30) 0.834 (14.90) 
12 0.057 (1.59) 0.067 (2.15) 0.066 (2.21) 0.189 (3.94) 0.621 (11.01) 
24 0.108 (2.95) 0.085 (2.78) 0.102 (3.31) 0.188 (4.61) 0.517 (10.79) 
60 0.116 (3.52) 0.109 (3.53) 0.116 (3.87) 0.191 (5.21) 0.469 (10.71) 
∞ 0.117 (3.58) 0.109 (3.43) 0.118 (3.86) 0.194 (5.21) 0.462 (10.53) 
Panel C. Expenditure Dispersion 
1 0.000 (0.00) 0.003 (0.14) 0.001 (0.09) 0.007 (0.39) 0.990 (32.26) 
3 0.035 (1.23) 0.028 (1.03) 0.012 (0.57) 0.014 (0.70) 0.911 (20.16) 
12 0.052 (1.71) 0.066 (2.04) 0.063 (2.07) 0.045 (1.69) 0.775 (16.04) 
24 0.093 (2.94) 0.093 (2.93) 0.092 (3.00) 0.054 (2.07) 0.668 (15.03) 
60 0.103 (3.45) 0.112 (3.55) 0.110 (3.56) 0.060 (2.39) 0.615 (14.24) 
∞ 0.103 (3.45) 0.116 (3.64) 0.114 (3.56) 0.061 (2.40) 0.606 (13.96) 
Panel D. CPI Disagreement 
1 0.000 (0.02) 0.002 (0.12) 0.000 (0.00) 0.002 (0.18) 0.995 (35.34) 
3 0.020 (0.78) 0.020 (0.84) 0.007 (0.40) 0.006 (0.36) 0.947 (23.12) 
12 0.041 (1.41) 0.083 (2.43) 0.095 (2.81) 0.023 (1.05) 0.757 (14.45) 
24 0.092 (2.95) 0.103 (3.13) 0.125 (3.78) 0.040 (1.65) 0.640 (13.44) 
60 0.098 (3.35) 0.120 (3.66) 0.138 (4.25) 0.057 (2.23) 0.588 (12.82) 
∞ 0.099 (3.37) 0.125 (3.70) 0.138 (4.15) 0.060 (2.32) 0.578 (12.54) 
Panel E. Tax Code Expiration 
1 0.000 (0.01) 0.004 (0.25) 0.004 (0.25) 0.006 (0.42) 0.986 (29.86) 
3 0.025 (0.89) 0.026 (0.96) 0.005 (0.29) 0.014 (0.72) 0.930 (20.91) 
12 0.051 (1.51) 0.072 (2.20) 0.052 (2.05) 0.052 (1.87) 0.772 (14.90) 
24 0.122 (3.29) 0.096 (3.08) 0.087 (3.14) 0.054 (2.18) 0.642 (13.13) 
60 0.125 (3.57) 0.101 (3.38) 0.106 (3.82) 0.076 (2.81) 0.592 (12.61) 
∞ 0.126 (3.63) 0.106 (3.47) 0.107 (3.79) 0.082 (2.84) 0.580 (12.37) 
Notes: Table 1 shows percent contributions of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and overall/component policy uncertainty to the overall variability of real stock returns. The forecast 
error variance decomposition is based on the structural VAR model described in the text. The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated 
using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. 
 
 
27 
 
Table 2. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of Economic Policy Uncertainty in United States 
Horizon Oil Supply Shock Aggregate Demand Shock Oil-Market Specific Demand Shock Stock Market Shocks Other Shocks 
Panel A. Overall Policy Uncertainty 
1 0.006 (0.28) 0.001 (0.07) 0.001 (0.05) 0.000 (0.00) 0.992 (32.08) 
3 0.007 (0.26) 0.013 (0.49) 0.001 (0.06) 0.096 (2.17) 0.883 (15.27) 
12 0.016 (0.48) 0.129 (1.94) 0.123 (1.69) 0.104 (1.98) 0.628 (7.17) 
24 0.063 (1.11) 0.096 (1.86) 0.255 (2.55) 0.098 (2.09) 0.489 (5.20) 
60 0.057 (0.92) 0.087 (1.26) 0.487 (3.95) 0.116 (1.60) 0.253 (2.77) 
∞ 0.123 (1.35) 0.136 (1.37) 0.569 (3.70) 0.058 (0.83) 0.114 (1.18) 
Panel B. News-Based Policy Uncertainty 
1 0.009 (0.41) 0.002 (0.13) 0.000 (0.01) 0.000 (0.00) 0.989 (33.73) 
3 0.009 (0.37) 0.019 (0.58) 0.000 (0.02) 0.114 (2.34) 0.859 (14.15) 
12 0.019 (0.59) 0.087 (1.58) 0.139 (2.00) 0.123 (2.23) 0.632 (7.60) 
24 0.061 (1.20) 0.081 (1.69) 0.192 (2.41) 0.112 (2.29) 0.554 (6.44) 
60 0.048 (0.97) 0.083 (1.42) 0.397 (3.93) 0.121 (1.95) 0.352 (4.15) 
∞ 0.066 (0.85) 0.083 (0.91) 0.588 (4.06) 0.078 (1.08) 0.185 (1.84) 
Panel C. Expenditure Dispersion 
1 0.005 (0.24) 0.032 (0.97) 0.020 (0.87) 0.000 (0.00) 0.943 (21.05) 
3 0.006 (0.24) 0.027 (0.80) 0.012 (0.59) 0.002 (0.18) 0.953 (20.34) 
12 0.031 (0.62) 0.340 (3.01) 0.023 (0.61) 0.006 (0.24) 0.600 (5.38) 
24 0.098 (1.21) 0.387 (3.45) 0.061 (0.94) 0.008 (0.21) 0.447 (4.13) 
60 0.128 (1.61) 0.318 (3.03) 0.116 (1.45) 0.053 (0.90) 0.386 (4.05) 
∞ 0.084 (1.09) 0.418 (3.20) 0.169 (1.77) 0.074 (1.08) 0.255 (2.76) 
Panel D. CPI Disagreement 
1 0.001 (0.04) 0.003 (0.16) 0.002 (0.14) 0.000 (0.00) 0.995 (39.27) 
3 0.004 (0.18) 0.014 (0.45) 0.009 (0.38) 0.001 (0.08) 0.973 (21.32) 
12 0.023 (0.65) 0.037 (0.90) 0.039 (0.87) 0.016 (0.57) 0.886 (12.79) 
24 0.033 (0.96) 0.085 (1.73) 0.150 (2.41) 0.052 (1.50) 0.680 (9.32) 
60 0.040 (1.04) 0.124 (2.04) 0.251 (3.53) 0.114 (2.24) 0.471 (6.55) 
∞ 0.039 (0.86) 0.247 (2.67) 0.240 (3.08) 0.098 (1.88) 0.376 (4.79) 
Panel E. Tax Code Expiration 
1 0.000 (0.04) 0.022 (0.83) 0.002 (0.10) 0.000 (0.00) 0.976 (31.48) 
3 0.001 (0.07) 0.054 (1.12) 0.005 (0.23) 0.002 (0.21) 0.938 (17.00) 
12 0.029 (0.58) 0.054 (0.74) 0.104 (1.52) 0.039 (0.90) 0.775 (7.39) 
24 0.069 (1.15) 0.109 (1.42) 0.239 (2.83) 0.035 (0.86) 0.549 (5.29) 
60 0.095 (1.37) 0.443 (3.36) 0.104 (1.71) 0.036 (0.72) 0.322 (2.88) 
∞ 0.125 (1.46) 0.574 (3.73) 0.080 (1.20) 0.026 (0.49) 0.195 (1.62) 
Notes: Table 2 shows percent contributions of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and stock market shocks to the overall variability of overall/component policy uncertainty in United 
States. The forecast error variance decomposition is based on the structural VAR model described in the text. The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' standard 
errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. 
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Table 3. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of Real Stock Returns in Europe/Canada 
Horizon Oil Supply Shock Aggregate Demand Shock Oil-Market Specific Demand Shock  Economic Policy Uncertainty Shocks Other Shocks 
Panel A. Overall Policy Uncertainty in Europe 
1 0.009 (0.16) 0.003 (0.05) 0.031 (0.44) 0.167 (1.43) 0.791 (6.02) 
3 0.008 (0.14) 0.085 (1.15) 0.075 (1.05) 0.211 (1.98) 0.622 (5.67) 
12 0.049 (0.85) 0.120 (1.84) 0.141 (2.09) 0.210 (2.80) 0.480 (5.86) 
24 0.085 (1.54) 0.172 (2.94) 0.166 (2.71) 0.218 (3.55) 0.360 (5.67) 
60 0.130 (2.22) 0.261 (3.90) 0.183 (3.01) 0.184 (3.11) 0.242 (4.38) 
∞ 0.105 (1.42) 0.355 (3.75) 0.107 (1.52) 0.245 (2.87) 0.188 (2.88) 
Panel B. Overall Policy Uncertainty in Canada 
1 0.018 (0.54) 0.027 (0.70) 0.003 (0.12) 0.031 (0.89) 0.921 (14.96) 
3 0.028 (0.83) 0.047 (1.17) 0.045 (1.13) 0.062 (1.43) 0.819 (11.99) 
12 0.085 (2.17) 0.101 (2.43) 0.103 (2.34) 0.076 (2.08) 0.636 (10.58) 
24 0.118 (3.24) 0.105 (2.81) 0.148 (3.50) 0.121 (3.47) 0.508 (9.98) 
60 0.119 (3.73) 0.138 (3.77) 0.160 (4.17) 0.134 (4.16) 0.450 (10.34) 
∞ 0.114 (3.63) 0.145 (3.78) 0.176 (4.27) 0.135 (4.13) 0.430 (9.98) 
Notes: Table 3 shows percent contributions of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and overall/component policy uncertainty to the overall variability of real stock returns in 
Europe/Canada. The forecast error variance decomposition is based on the structural VAR model described in the text. The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' 
standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. 
 
